What is the most critical vulnerability for providing support to naval operations in the current context ?
The major challenge lies in our ability to maintain a chain of support in all possible fields of action, ranging from ‘standard’ aggression (physical, cyber, etc.) to attacks that are less direct but just as dangerous (reputational, financial, etc.).
The support systems of previous decades were primarily designed for predictable operations in a relatively controlled operational context, with:
- secure back offices;
- continuous logistical flows using military as well as civilian carriers;
- planned maintenance cycles during technical stops.
In a high-intensity conflict, however, these assumptions no longer hold:
- deployments last beyond the duration of programs;
- flows are interrupted;
- infrastructure is targeted;
- procurement chains are fragmented;
- the ability to quickly mobilise and project the right technical skills is becoming as critical as the parts themselves.
Recent events have of course also shown us that yesterday’s allies may not necessarily support our future campaigns. Support systems must therefore take this situation into account when it comes to planning for the sovereignty of critical skills and supplies.
What levers can we use to adapt and overcome this challenge ?
There are three main levers.
- Crew autonomy: naval power no longer means just the platform itself, but also its ability to remain available over time, repairable and sustainable wherever it is located. The most effective way to maintain this capacity obviously relies on the skills already available on site, located as close as possible to the vessels themselves. A crew’s autonomy in being able to maintain the ship’s ability to accomplish its mission has always been one of the fundamental principles of any navy. The threat of high-intensity conflicts pushes this necessity a step further, and both industries and navies now have a duty to consider carefully how to integrate it over the entire product life cycle.
- External support resilient to the first shockwave: in a disrupted context with multiple threats making it difficult to prepare for all eventualities, the system must be as resilient as possible in the event of a break, even temporary, in the support chain. This above all implies reducing dependency on the value chain to ensure the rapid and autonomous response capacity of first-tier prime contractors, while the entire ecosystem is remobilised and reorganised in the actual context of the declared conflict. Naval Group strives to achieve this position by maintaining a wide range of skills and the ability to intervene almost autonomously on all the vessel’s installations and equipment, with our technical levels of intervention guaranteeing its short-term availability.
- External support capable of addressing major repairs in reactive mode: we need to anticipate needs for repairing damage over and above the known spectrum, both in times of peace and crisis. The associated repairs require full mobilisation of the skills employed in the vessel’s design, as the expertise needed to repair such damage is inseparable from the expert knowledge used in its design. The resilience of our support system can be reinforced by developing such skills within navies and the industrial world. This again is the model adopted by Naval Group.
How does high-intensity warfare challenge current models of naval maintenance and support ?
High-intensity warfare highlights the need to move away from past models, often based on predictability, planning and securing the rear. In a high-intensity conflict, scheduled maintenance cycles are disrupted, infrastructure may be degraded or unavailable, and the priority therefore becomes adaptability. We need to ensure ship availability in the shortest possible time.
In the event of combat damage, in particular, returning a vessel to active service may require the implementation of entirely new repair processes requiring technical expertise, ingenuity and adaptability, all of which undeniably require the combination of the vessel’s designer skills and the experience of the repair entity. The closer the integration of these two skills, the greater the ability to take on major repairs quickly and effectively.
Through-Life Support (TLS) is no longer a linear industrial process, but a fully-fledged operational capability, integrated into naval operations.
In concrete terms, this may mean abandoning peacetime reflexes and accepting more ad hoc maintenance, innovative repairs within the design margins in order to increase the responsiveness necessary to allow safe continuation of the mission, as well as a greater tolerance for compromise between optimal performance and immediate availability.
To summarise, high-intensity warfare raises the requirement for a wide spectrum of expertise, for all contributors to the maintenance and support system, because as we have seen, high intensity involves three factors:
- uncertainty: hence the need to be able to adapt cycles, hence the importance of industrial and government stakeholders who are experts in support policy;
- duration: hence the importance of being able to control and modify the balance between prevention and correction, hence the importance of stakeholders who are experts in maintenance:
- aggressiveness: hence the importance of mastering repair solutions, with prime contractors who are designers, manufacturers and maintenance operators, and therefore experts in large-scale repairs.
How should the relationship between the Navy and industry evolve in a protracted conflict scenario ?
In a prolonged, high-intensity conflict, the notion of ecosystem is key: the ecosystem is the ship, the crew, the Fleet Support Service (SSF), industrial prime contractors, their partners and subcontractors, military workshops, and infrastructure.
In the event of tension or conflict, this ecosystem must be mobilised and called on to innovate, but not reinvented. We must be able to rely on an appropriate distribution of responsibilities, skills and dialogue.
Industry is a strategic component for the Navy, providing it with the essential instruments of power. This relationship must also address the issue of industrial sovereignty: no navy can sustain a high-intensity effort in the long term without a robust, protected and prepared industrial base.
Finally, the transition from peacetime to wartime support cannot take place at the flick of a switch; it is vital that navies and industry work towards much closer integration, not only in times of crisis but also in peacetime, on the basis of joint operational preparation. This means anticipating the structures, processes and personnel that will need to be put in place when “combat TLS” is triggered. This needs to be thought through in advance.
For example, Naval Group has increased its operational reserve by 150% in the past four years and was the first to commit to the industrial defence reserve with the French Defence Procurement Agency (DGA), thus placing its industrial skills directly at the service of the armed forces.